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Note 
 
Mayo, Myriad, and a Muddled Analysis: Do 
Recent Changes to the Patentable Subject Matter 
Doctrine Threaten Patent Protections for 
Epigenetics-Based Inventions? 
Mike Sikora∗ 
When an entire industry builds itself around a legal right, 
any change to that right can irrevocably alter the industry. The 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries rely on patent pro-
tection perhaps more than any other industry, leaving them 
highly susceptible to legal changes. Unfortunately for them, pa-
tent protections have begun to erode in recent years, starting 
with the America Invents Act, which created new Patent Office 
procedures for invalidating patents.1 But the changes did not 
end there. In deciding three cases from 2012 to 2014, the Su-
preme Court reformed the patentable subject matter doctrine, 
which interprets 35 U.S.C. § 101.2 Together, the doctrine and 
§ 101 serve as a preliminary patenting requirement that identi-
fies what types of subject matter is eligible to be patented. This 
Note argues that by changing the inquiry for this fundamental 
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chemistry & B.A. Political Science 2015, University of Minnesota. I would like 
to thank Professor Tom Cotter for his commentary and input throughout the 
writing and submission process. Also, a special thank you to Kristin McGaver, 
my parents Tom and Barb Sikora, and the rest of my friends and family for their 
constant encouragement and support. And last, thank you to Mitch Ness, Ron 
Waclawski, and the rest of the Minnesota Law Review Editorial Board and Staff 
who contributed to this Note. Copyright © 2018 by Mike Sikora. 
 1. See Donika P. Pentcheva et al., Invalidating Patents after the America 
Invents Act, AM. BAR ASS’N (Apr. 16, 2014), http://apps.americanbar.org/ 
litigation/committees/youngadvocate/articles/spring2014-0414-invalidating 
-patents-after-america-invents-act.html (discussing invalidation procedures in-
cluding Post-Grant Review and Inter Partes Review). 
 2. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). Though § 101 formally refers to “patentable” in-
ventions, this Note intentionally uses a different phrasing, patent eligibility, to 
avoid conflating a § 101 inquiry with the full patentability determination made 
by the Patent Office. This difference acknowledges that a given invention may 
satisfy § 101, yet remain unpatentable because it fails to satisfy another re-
quirement. 
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patentability requirement, the Supreme Court has opened Pan-
dora’s Box; it has categorically undercut patent protections for 
biotechnology in a manner that could irrevocably and undesira-
bly alter the industry. 
Traditionally, the patentable subject matter doctrine has 
considered anything man-made to be patent eligible, but ex-
cludes three categories of subject matter as patent ineligible: (1) 
abstract ideas; (2) laws of nature; and (3) natural phenomena.3 
These categories effectively preclude patenting anything that a 
person did not actually invent. In perhaps the most high-profile 
§ 101 case this century, Association for Molecular Pathology v. 
Myriad Genetics, Inc.,4 the Supreme Court unanimously invali-
dated patents on human genes commonly associated with breast 
cancer because they covered ineligible natural phenomena. 
Many lauded Myriad, the second of the Court’s three recent rul-
ings on patentable subject matter, because it removed “a major 
barrier to innovation in the areas of biotechnology, drug devel-
opment and medical diagnostics,”5 despite the negative conse-
quences for biotech investments.6 As this Note discusses, how-
ever, Myriad’s more important contribution lies with how it and 
the other two cases transformed the patentable subject matter 
doctrine. 
The Court’s three-year reevaluation culminated in Alice 
Corp. v. CLS Bank International,7 where it articulated a new 
two-part test for determining when subject matter is patent eli-
gible (the “Mayo test”). This doctrinal shift, which altered how 
courts determine when a patent impermissibly claims an ab-
 
 3. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601–02 (2010). This Note focuses on 
the natural phenomena and natural law categories, which interact closely with 
epigenetics-based technology. 
 4. 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013). 
 5. Eleonore Pauwels, Op-Ed, Our Genes, Their Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (June 
18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/opinion/our-genes-their-secrets 
.html; see also Editorial, Are Human Genes Patentable?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/15/opinion/are-human-genes 
-patentable.html (reiterating Judge William Bryson’s statement in dissent that 
patents “like those of Myriad are ‘a significant obstacle to the next generation 
of innovation in genetic medicine’”). 
 6. See Adam Liptak, Justices, 9–0, Bar Patenting Human Genes, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/14/us/supreme-court 
-rules-human-genes-may-not-be-patented.html (noting that the decision would 
likely “reduce the cost of genetic testing” but “discourage investment in some 
forms of genetic research”). 
 7. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
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stract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomena, led to a whirl-
wind of patent invalidations. Litigants challenged patents based 
on this new standard, and in the first two years courts invali-
dated seventy percent of them.8 The extent to which this phe-
nomenon, labeled by one commentator as “#Alicestorm,”9 will 
continue to affect proceedings, both in federal courts and at the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), remains unknown. 
In the wake of Alice, however, biotechnology patents appear es-
pecially susceptible to § 101 invalidations, alongside software, 
business methods, and communications patents.10 
Biotechnology’s apparent susceptibility to § 101 invalidation 
stems from the close relationship between biotech inventions 
and the natural phenomena and laws of nature that they rely on. 
Natural phenomena refers to anything, or any characteristic of 
a thing, that could be discovered in nature.11 Similarly, natural 
laws include correlations, causes, and other laws governing how 
the natural world works.12 Under the Mayo test, patent eligibil-
ity arises when the claimed subject matter amounts to “signifi-
cantly more than a patent upon the natural [phenomenon or] law 
itself.”13 The term biotechnology calls to mind images of medical 
devices, but more broadly encompasses engineered biomolecules 
and cells, synthetic organisms, molecular diagnostics, and phar-
maceuticals. The Mayo test thus proves problematic for biotech 
scientists who invent by manipulating natural biological struc-
tures into nonnatural arrangements, as this approach makes it 
 
 8. Robert R. Sachs, Two Years After Alice: A Survey of the Impact of a “Mi-
nor Case,” BILSKI BLOG (June 16, 2016), http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2016/ 
06/two-years-after-alice-a-survey-of-the-impact-of-a-minor-case.html (noting 
higher invalidation rates at the Federal Circuit, which ruled against the pa-
tentee thirty-eight out of forty times on § 101 motions). 
 9. Robert R. Sachs, A Survey of Patent Invalidations Since Alice, LAW360 
(Jan. 13, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/604235/a-survey-of-patent 
-invalidations-since-alice. 
 10. See Sachs, supra note 8 (demonstrating in Figure 2 that outcomes for 
Federal Court § 101 invalidity challenges differ based on the type of patent at 
issue). 
 11. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2107, 2116–17 (2013) (contrasting the discovery of natural phenomena with in-
vention). 
 12. See Mayo Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 66 
(2012) (deciding that the relation between certain blood metabolites and the 
likelihood a thiopurine compound would “prove ineffective or cause harm” was 
“a consequence of the ways in which thiopurine compounds are metabolized by 
the body” and therefore an ineligible natural law). 
 13. Id. at 72–73. 
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difficult for nonexperts to distinguish the invention from the un-
derlying biological structures. With such a nebulous standard 
(“significantly more”), and judges that lack the scientific training 
to draw informed distinctions, one would expect inconsistent de-
cisions on biotechnology’s patent eligibility. 
Long-term, inconsistent decisions on § 101 invalidations im-
pose a significant burden on the biotechnology industry. Biotech-
related ventures require large investments of time and money to 
attain profitability, and have historically relied on guaranteed 
patent monopolies to justify the expense.14 As changes to the pa-
tentable subject matter doctrine have decreased the certainty of 
biotech patent rights, the risk associated with investing in nas-
cent biotech industries has greatly increased. In the absence of 
clearly enforceable patent rights, biotech firms may begin choos-
ing to protect their inventions through trade-secret laws.15 This 
alternative proves suboptimal for both biotech firms and the sci-
entific field, as the firm lacks its assured monopoly and the se-
crecy hinders rapid scientific advancement. Relatively unestab-
lished fields of biotechnology will suffer the most from 
inconsistent patent rights, as they will lack the attractiveness to 
investors and public technology disclosures that other fields en-
joyed in their infancy.16 
Epigenetics, which many consider integral to the future of 
personalized medicine, is perhaps the most prominent biotech 
field currently at this crossroads.17 Though academics have ex-
tensively researched epigenetics, widespread epigenetics-based 
medical applications have yet to be developed. As start-ups begin 
 
 14. See Byron V. Olsen, The Biotechnology Balancing Act: Patents for Gene 
Fragments, and Licensing the “Useful Arts,” 7 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 295, 321 
(1997); see also Oren Ginsberg, Unwinding the DNA Double-Helix: An Alternate 
Resolution to the Federal Circuit’s Decision in Association for Molecular Pathol-
ogy for Simplifying §101 Patent Eligibility Determinations, 22 FED. CIR. 
B.J. 563, 563 (2013) (stating that the USPTO’s issuance of “patents covering 
isolated human DNA molecules” sparked advancements in genetic engineering 
and the medical sciences). 
 15. See Pauwels, supra note 5 (suggesting that the Myriad decision will 
prompt biotech firms to rely on trade secret protection more heavily). 
 16. See Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Patent?, 
23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1063, 1078 (2008) (“[I]ncreased patenting by venture-
backed companies in . . . biotech industries is significantly correlated with total 
investment, total number of financing rounds, and firm longevity . . . .”). 
 17. See Mahmood Rasool et al., The Role of Epigenetics in Personalized 
Medicine: Challenges and Opportunities, 8 BMC MED. GENOMICS (SUPPLEMENT 
1) S5, at 3 (2015) (noting that epigenetic biomarkers “are imperative to achieve 
personalized . . . therapies”). 
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developing marketable applications and face a gauntlet of fed-
eral regulations, most will seek investment and/or acquisition. 
Without a clearly enforceable patent, however, investors or ac-
quiring companies will lack incentives to involve themselves 
early, which will result in cures and treatments reaching mar-
kets much more slowly. 
This Note seeks to address the new patent eligibility in-
quiry’s impact on biotechnology by demonstrating how convo-
luted the analysis becomes when applied to epigenetics. Part I 
details the change in the Supreme Court’s treatment of § 101 
and provides background information on biotechnology and epi-
genetics. Part II demonstrates how the close relation between 
epigenetics-based inventions and their underlying subject mat-
ter complicates the analysis, creating difficult questions that 
judges are ill-equipped to resolve, and resulting in uncertain pa-
tent rights. Part III argues that uncertain patent rights for epi-
genetic-based technology is unacceptable because it leaves pa-
tent holders in a quickly advancing industry without efficient 
means to bring their inventions to market. It concludes that Con-
gress should address these uncertain intellectual property rights 
by exempting epigenetics-based technology from § 101 and rely-
ing on either the 35 U.S.C. § 103 nonobviousness requirement or 
the European inventive-step concept to prevent overly broad pa-
tents from stagnating scientific progress. 
I.  THE MAYO TEST FOR PATENT ELIGIBILITY UNDER 
§ 101 AND THE BASICS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY   
This Part begins by discussing how recent Supreme Court 
rulings have changed the core patent eligibility inquiry and how 
the Myriad ruling may have complicated its application to bio-
technology. It then briefly reviews other patentability require-
ments, including novelty and nonobviousness requirements in 
the United States and the inventive-step concept used by the Eu-
ropean Patent Office (EPO). Lastly, Part I prepares readers for 
its later application of the Mayo test by describing the unique 
features of biotechnology and explaining epigenetics and its po-
tential role in personalized medicine. 
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A. UNDERSTANDING THE ANALYSIS FOR DETERMINING 
35 U.S.C. § 101 PATENT ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER: THE MAYO 
TEST AND MYRIAD 
Though the Constitution permits granting “[i]nventors the 
exclusive [r]ight to their . . . [d]iscoveries,” Congress more nar-
rowly defines what can be patented in 35 U.S.C. § 101.18 Patent 
eligible subject matter includes “any new and useful process, ma-
chine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement thereof.”19 Historically, the Supreme Court 
construed § 101 broadly, stating that “anything under the sun 
. . . made by man” could be patented.20 The Court constrained its 
broad construction only by noting that “laws of nature, physical 
phenomena, and abstract ideas [are] . . . not patentable.”21 These 
three categorical exceptions are rooted in the common law and 
lack a statutory basis.22 
In 2010, the Court began to revisit § 101, rejecting the no-
tion that it “ha[d] endorsed the machine-or-transformation test 
as the exclusive test” for patent eligibility, despite the Federal 
Circuit’s longstanding use of it.23 This ruling merely confused 
courts engaging in § 101 inquiries, since it provided no replace-
ment test. Two years later, the Supreme Court began to clarify 
its position on § 101 in Mayo Collaborative Services. v. Prome-
theus Labs., Inc., where it first used—but did not formally artic-
ulate—the current two-part test for determining patent eligibil-
ity.24 It eventually described the two-step Mayo test in Alice as 
follows: “We must first determine whether the claims at issue are 
 
 18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added); 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 19. 35 U.S.C § 101. The Patent Act of 1952 introduced this language as part 
of Congress’s patent law reform. See Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 101, 66 Stat. 792, 797 
(1952). 
 20. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. Rep. No. 
82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)). Chakrabarty holds 
particular relevance to the patent eligibility of biotechnology because the Court 
ruled that organisms, if man-made, are patent eligible. Id. at 310. 
 21. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 303. 
 22. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601–02 (2010) (“While these excep-
tions are not required by the statutory text, they are consistent with the notion 
that a patentable process must be ‘new and useful.’”). 
 23. Id. at 604. The Court also held that business methods were not categor-
ically excluded from patentability, but that the method in dispute was an ineli-
gible abstract idea. Id. at 606–612. The machine-or-transformation test pro-
vides patent eligibility when a process is: (1) tied to a machine; and (2) 
transforms an article into a different state or thing. See id. at 600 (citing In re 
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc)). 
 24. Mayo Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 77–80 (2012) 
(engaging in a two-step inquiry the Court eventually named the Mayo test). 
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directed to a patent-ineligible concept. . . . [If so,] we must [then] 
examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it con-
tains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed 
abstract idea into a patent eligible application.”25 
By providing this new test, the Court significantly stream-
lined the analysis for § 101 into a straightforward inquiry, rep-
resenting a large improvement over the variety of nonexclusive 
tests used prior to Alice. But despite finally articulating the test 
for patent eligible subject matter, the Supreme Court created a 
new problem by declining to discuss how much a law of nature, 
abstract idea, or physical phenomenon must minimally be trans-
formed to become patent eligible.26 . 
For biotechnology, this problem is exacerbated by Myriad, 
the Court’s 2013 case decided after Mayo (2012), but before the 
two-part test’s articulation in Alice (2014). Despite the Alice 
Court’s assertion that it had already “set forth a framework for 
distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phe-
nomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent eligible 
applications of those concepts,”27 in Myriad it failed to use the 
two-part Mayo test for either of its holdings. Nowhere did it ex-
amine whether the patent claims (1) were directed to an ineligi-
ble concept; and, if so, (2) whether they nevertheless contained 
an inventive concept. Instead, the Court based its first holding 
on the difference between discovery and invention, noting that 
“Myriad found the location of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, but 
that discovery, by itself, does not render the BRCA genes . . . pa-
tent eligible.”28 For its second holding, the Myriad Court ruled 
cDNA, a gene copy from which humans have removed noncoding 
DNA, patent eligible simply because “it is distinct from the DNA 
from which it was derived” and therefore “not a ‘product of na-
ture.’”29  
 
 25. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355–57 (2014) (quoting 
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72) (emphasis added). 
 26. See id. at 2357–59. 
 27. Id. at 2355. 
 28. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 
2117 (2013). Even if decided post-Alice, this first holding would not require a 
Mayo analysis, as Myriad Genetics had expressly claimed a natural phenome-
non, violating decades of judicial rulings describing natural phenomena as inel-
igible subject matter. 
 29. Id. at 2119 (emphasis added). Genes naturally contain alternating cod-
ing and noncoding regions of DNA, with the important information for protein 
synthesis located in the coding regions. BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BI-
OLOGY OF THE CELL 317 (6th ed., 2015). In effect, cDNA is a copy of the gene 
which excludes the “filler” portions. See id. at 315–18, 469–70. 
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The confusion regarding how to conduct a § 101 inquiry for 
biotechnology stems from the lack of Mayo analysis in Myriad’s 
second holding. Under the Mayo test, being distinct from a nat-
ural product does not necessarily make cDNA patent eligible. 
Mayo requires asking (1) whether the claims were directed to 
(not distinct from) an abstract idea, natural phenomena or law 
of nature; and if so (2) whether they incorporated an “inventive 
concept sufficient to transform” the ineligible subject matter.30 
By not applying the test, the Court left a significant question re-
garding Mayo’s application to biotechnology: can a claim be di-
rected to natural phenomena without expressly claiming a prod-
uct of nature?31 In other words, is something that closely 
resembles or is designed for a natural phenomenon, yet is not 
naturally occurring, directed to the underlying natural phenom-
enon? If so, most biotechnology would be categorically directed 
to natural phenomena because of the close relation between bio-
technology and the natural phenomena it repurposes.32 Accord-
ingly, almost all forms of biotechnology would satisfy § 101 only 
by sufficiently transforming the natural phenomena. 
B. NOVELTY, NONOBVIOUSNESS, AND INVENTIVE STEP IN 
PATENTABILITY DETERMINATIONS 
This Section provides a brief overview of additional patent-
ability requirements in the United States and European Union. 
 
 30. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357 (quoting Mayo Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus 
Labs, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72 (2012)). Dan L. Burk attempts to overlay this two-
step analysis onto the Myriad opinion, concluding that the Myriad cDNAs must 
have “passe[d] the first prong of the test and never reache[d] the second.” Dan 
L. Burk, Dolly and Alice, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 606, 610–611 (2016). “It seems 
implausible that cDNA could pass the second prong of the test; there is no pal-
pable ‘inventive concept.’” Id. at 610. 
 31. This question remains unanswered, in part because none of the Su-
preme Court’s other rulings on patentable subject matter concerned a natural 
phenomenon. Burk, supra note 30, at 610. Though unaddressed by the Supreme 
Court, but the Federal Circuit did provide an example of patent claims directed 
to a natural phenomenon, despite not expressly claiming the phenomenon, in 
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(holding that a method for detecting cell-free fetal DNA was directed to its nat-
ural occurrence). Thus, for the time being, the answer is yes: a claim can be 
directed to natural phenomena without expressly claiming a product of nature. 
 32. See generally Philip Merksamer, Ariosa Diagnostics v. Sequenom: Me-
tastasis of Mayo and Myriad and the Evisceration of Patent Eligibility for Mo-
lecular Diagnostics, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 495, 531 (2016) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court expanded the judicial exceptions to patentable subject matter 
in Mayo and Myriad enough to “endanger patentability for molecular diagnos-
tics”). 
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Subsection 1 describes the American novelty and nonobvious-
ness requirements. Subsection 2 then compares those require-
ments to the European Union’s novelty and inventive-step re-
quirements. Because these doctrines are distinct from a § 101 
analysis, they offer an alternative means for Congress to limit 
broad grants of biotechnology patents, as discussed in Part III.B.  
1. Novelty and Nonobviousness in U.S. Patentability 
Determinations 
After satisfying 35 U.S.C. § 101 by claiming patent eligible 
subject matter, any U.S. patent application must also satisfy 
novelty33 and nonobviousness34 requirements to be patented. 
The novelty inquiry examines whether a single prior art refer-
ence contains each and every element of a claim in the same ar-
rangement.35 If subject matter of a claim was previously “pa-
tented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on 
sale, or otherwise available to the public,” it cannot be pa-
tented.36 In effect, novelty ensures that only new and uncopied 
inventions can be patented. 
Nonobviousness examines prior art as well, but its inquiry 
focuses more on potential modifications to or combinations of 
prior art references.37 To be patentable, an invention cannot be 
“obvious . . . to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which 
the claimed invention pertains.”38 Unlike novelty, which pre-
vents patenting old inventions, nonobviousness prevents patent-
ing obvious variations of old inventions. Together, the novelty 
and nonobviousness requirements ensure that patentees de-
serve the exclusive rights a patent grants them over their inven-
tions. 
 
 33. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 34. Id. § 103. 
 35. Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 
1987) (“[E]ach and every element . . . is found . . . in a single prior art refer-
ence.”). Prior art can be defined as “a reference of some type . . . or some type of 
knowledge or event . . . that demonstrates that he invention in question is not 
new.” Gene Quinn, What Is Prior Art?, IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 2, 2010), http://www 
.ipwatchdog.com/2010/10/02/what-is-prior-art/id=12677. 
 36. 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
 37. See Application of Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1019–20 (describing the 
nonobviousness analysis). 
 38. 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
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2. Patentability at the European Patent Office 
Where the USPTO uses eligible subject matter, novelty, and 
nonobviousness requirements to determine patentability, the 
EPO instead uses invention, novelty, and an inventive step.39 
The invention requirement serves the same purpose as the eligi-
ble subject matter requirement, but operates without a specific 
test.40 Rather than undergo a Mayo-type analysis, the EPO 
simply rejects any application claiming an invention that falls 
into a category prohibited by the European Patent Convention.41 
The novelty requirements match almost exactly, except for mi-
nor differences in how each jurisdiction defines which prior art 
references apply.42 Even the nonobviousness and inventive-step 
concepts share similarity, as the inventive-step inquiry asks 
whether the invention is “obvious to [a] skilled person in the 
light of the state of the art.”43 Inventive step differs greatly from 
nonobviousness, however, in that it “is usually evaluated on the 
basis of the ‘problem-solution’ approach,” which places more em-
phasis on whether the solution to the problem would have been 
obvious.44 
C. THE UNIQUE DISPOSITION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY AND 
EPIGENETICS 
This Section introduces the close relation between biotech-
nology and underlying natural phenomena, which Part II argues 
is problematic for the Mayo test. Subsection 1 focuses on broader 
characteristics of biotechnology, including a description of how 
and why scientists repurpose natural components. It describes 
synthetic biology and systems biology, explaining how innova-
tion in each field involves repurposing natural components in 
very distinct ways. In doing so, Subsection 1 provides a broader 
 
 39. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, HOW TO GET A EUROPEAN PATENT 15 
(2016) [hereinafter EPO GUIDE], http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/ 
eponet.nsf/0/8266ED0366190630C12575E10051F40E/$File/how_to_get_a_ 
european_patent_20160422_en.pdf.  
 40. See id. at 15–16 (broadly discussing the invention concept). 
 41. Id. The European Patent Convention specifically excludes programs for 
computers, methods of treatment or diagnosis of the human or animal body, and 
plant and animal varieties. Id. Notably, the list of unpatentable categories is 
considered nonexhaustive. Id. at 15. 
 42. Id. at 16–17 (“An invention is considered to be new if it does not form 
part of the state of the art.”). 
 43. Id. at 17. 
 44. Id. 
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view of how biotechnology inherently causes problems for § 101 
inquiries. 
Subsection 2 provides a much more detailed tutorial on epi-
genetics, a specific field of systems biology, which will later serve 
as the basis for Part II’s argument that the Mayo test leads to 
inconsistent results and Part III.A’s argument that the incon-
sistency could strangle a promising field of biotechnology. In a 
§ 101 inquiry, judges must understand both the technology and 
how it relates to its field to reach a proper decision. With this in 
mind, Subsection 2 explains the core epigenetic features and the 
field’s future importance to personalized medicine. 
1. Biotechnology Generally 
All biotechnology repurposes or manipulates a biological 
process or molecule to either perform a nonnatural function or 
perform its natural function differently.45 To understand just 
how powerful biological systems are, one must understand that 
biological systems consist of countless intricate interactions, all 
optimized by evolution over billions of iterations to help the sys-
tem function better.46 Because natural selection favors overall 
system functionality, evolution usually only optimizes interac-
tions between biomolecules to the extent that doing so benefits 
the entire system.47 In other words, biological systems contain 
countless biomolecules that perform varied functions at different 
levels of optimization. 
In light of their diverse functionality and moderate optimi-
zation, biomolecules frequently provide an excellent starting 
point for industrial applications. The enzyme Lipase is used in-
dustrially in its natural form for stain removal, cheese flavoring, 
dough stability in baking, contaminant control in paper manu-
 
 45. See What is Biotechnology?, BIOTECH. INNOVATION ORG., https://www 
.bio.org/what-biotechnology (last visited Apr. 19, 2018) (defining biotechnology 
broadly as “technology based on biology”). 
 46. See Michael Lynch et al., Evolutionary Cell Biology: Two Origins, One 
Objective, 111 PNAS 16990, 16990 (2014) (“[A]ll evolutionary change ultimately 
requires modifications at the cellular level . . . .”). The term biological system 
used here refers to a self-sufficient biological unit, usually self-enclosed units 
like cells. The terminology is meant to provide a comparison to mechanical sys-
tems, which generally speaking do not self-optimize. 
 47. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 29, at 15 (“[G]enetic specifications 
change, giving [organisms] new ways to exploit the environment more effec-
tively, to survive in competition with others, and to reproduce successfully.”). 
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facturing, and as a catalyst in the synthesis of organic chemi-
cals.48 But unlike Lipase, many biomolecules must be optimized 
beyond their natural function to fulfill an industrial need.49 This 
process of engineering biomolecules for use in an engineered sys-
tem is commonly referred to as “synthetic biology.”50 Synthetic 
biology and its industrial applications may eventually offer more 
efficient means to “produce enzymes, chemicals, polymers, or 
even everyday products such as vitamins and fuel.”51 
Though components of biological systems can readily be 
modified and used outside the system, biological systems can 
only incorporate nonnatural components in rare circumstances. 
This is because nearly “all [bio]molecules are produced from a 
small set of about 50 monomers” (which are small molecules that 
serve as subunits).52 Cells create a wealth of complex biomole-
cules from standardized, “nearly universal” monomers by com-
bining them in various lengths and patterns into polymers, just 
as songwriters create intricate melodies with a few well-chosen 
notes.53 DNA, RNA, and proteins exemplify this principle.54 All 
natural DNA strands consist of only four types of deoxy-ribonu-
cleotide monomers;55 all natural RNA strands consist of only 
four types of ribonucleotide monomers;56 and the vast majority 
of proteins consist of only twenty different types of amino acid 
 
 48. Ole Kirk et al., Industrial Enzyme Applications, 13 CURRENT OPINION 
BIOTECH. 345, 346 tbl. 1 (2002). 
 49. See Inge J. Minten, et al., Post-Production Modification of Industrial 
Enzymes, 98 APPLIED MICROBIOLOGY & BIOTECH. 6215, 6215 (2014) (“The de-
mands of these industries with regard to enzyme performance, substrate speci-
ficity, stability, solubility, pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamics properties 
are diverse and tuning of enzymes to fit the needs of a specific process is often 
desired.”). To make patent eligibility determination, courts must first decide 
how much a natural molecule must minimally be transformed for patent eligi-
bility to arise. See infra Part II.B (identifying the types of biological questions 
which may arise in deciding a line of minimum transformation). 
 50. Synthetic Biology Explained, BIOTECH. INNOVATION ORG., https://www 
.bio.org/articles/synthetic-biology-explained (last visited Apr. 19, 2018). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Regina Bailey, Biological Polymers - Biomolecules, THOUGHTCO., 
https://www.thoughtco.com/biological-polymers-373562 (last updated Oct. 17, 
2017). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Though this Note specifically mentions the types of monomers that com-
pose DNA, RNA and protein (deoxy-ribonucleotides, ribo-nucleotides, and 
amino acids), it does so only to illustrate that different types of biomolecules 
utilize different monomers. The functional differences between them are not 
important for the purposes of this Section. 
 55. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 29, at 3. 
 56. Id. at 4. 
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monomers.57 Your various genes, RNA strands, and proteins are 
created by combining these base components in countless ways. 
Evolution has both created this system of standardized com-
ponents and optimized molecular interactions between the com-
ponents, meaning biological systems are largely inflexible and 
only function with very specific sets of interactions. Continuing 
with the DNA-RNA-protein example, the “central dogma” of bi-
ology states that genetic information is encoded in DNA, tran-
scribed into RNA, and then translated into functional proteins.58 
This core relationship between DNA, RNA, and proteins defines 
almost all biological systems and cannot be replaced or signifi-
cantly altered.59 In part, the relationship relies on how stand-
ardized the subunits (or monomers) of DNA, RNA, and protein 
are. This standardization allows cell machinery to recognize and 
convert a sequence of DNA monomers into a corresponding se-
quence of RNA monomers during transcription, and then recog-
nize and convert that RNA sequence into a sequence of amino 
acid monomers during translation.60 Replacing these essential 
building blocks with synthetic nucleotides or amino acids is both 
rare and extraordinarily difficult to achieve because the cell ma-
chinery must also be changed to recognize the synthetic compo-
nents.61 This same idea holds true for biomolecules generally, as 
 
 57. Id. at 6. Many proteins undergo posttranslational chemical modifica-
tions that alter certain amino acids, leading to significant diversity among pro-
tein structures. Id. at 165–66. 
 58. Id. at 299. DNA consists of four types of monomers (nucleotides) and 
stores genetic information by arranging them in a meaningful sequence. Id. at 
175. Transcription is the process of unwinding DNA strands and copying the 
genetic information by creating a single-stranded RNA molecule that mirrors 
the gene’s nucleotide sequence. Id. at 301–04. Translation is the process of read-
ing this RNA copy’s nucleotide sequence and converting it into an amino acid 
sequence. Id. at 333–36. After posttranslational modifications and folding, the 
amino acid sequence becomes a functional protein. Id. at 353. 
 59. See id. at 299 (noting that all cells express genetic information “from 
DNA to RNA to protein,” making the principle “fundamental” to molecular biol-
ogy). 
 60. See id. at 3–6 (describing generally how genetic information becomes 
functional proteins). 
 61. See generally Alexis J. Rovner et al., Recoded Organisms Engineered to 
Depend on Synthetic Amino Acids, 518 NATURE 89 (2015) (discussing their 
breakthrough in engineering cells to rely on synthetic amino acids); William 
Herkewitz, X & Y: Two New Letters for the DNA Alphabet, POPULAR MECHANICS 
(May 7, 2014), http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/health/a10512/x-y 
-scientists-create-two-new-letters-for-dna-16769967 (“Many in the broader com-
munity thought that [integrating synthetic nucleotides into a living organism] 
would be impossible to achieve.”). 
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cell machinery is only optimized to recognize natural compo-
nents. 
For this reason, innovations in systems biology usually come 
from rearranging the naturally occurring base components of 
DNA, RNA, proteins, or other cellular features in a nonnatural 
conformation.62 Rather than modify biomolecules as in synthetic 
biology, systems biology seeks to uncover natural cellular inter-
actions and construct a larger picture of natural biological sys-
tems.63 The larger picture consists not only of DNA, RNA, and 
proteins, but also cell signaling, gene expression, and epigenetic 
modifications, all of which also rely on specific, evolutionarily op-
timized interactions for functionality.64 This reliance on natural 
interactions limits how much one can transform a system com-
ponent before it ceases to function within the system.65 Though 
this limitation on transformation proves problematic for indus-
trial applications, it actually makes systems biology particularly 
useful for biomedical applications. Synthetic components can 
rarely function in a patient’s natural biological system, whereas 
a biomolecule subtly modified through a systems biology ap-
proach would likely function properly. 
2. Epigenetics Basics 
Epigenetics involves “the study of phenomena and mecha-
nisms that cause chromosome-bound, heritable changes to gene 
expression that are not dependent on changes to DNA se-
quence.”66 Importantly, epigenetics studies changes in gene ex-
pression, not substantive changes to actual genes.67 Changes to 
 
 62. See Synthetic Biology Explained, supra note 50 (noting that systems bi-
ology focuses on natural biological systems while synthetic biology focuses on 
engineered biological systems). 
 63. Christopher Wanjek, Systems Biology as Defined by NIH: An Intellec-
tual Resource for Integrative Biology, 19 NIH CATALYST 1, 1 (Nov.–Dec. 2011), 
https://irp.nih.gov/catalyst/v19i6/systems-biology-as-defined-by-nih (last vis-
ited Apr. 19, 2018). Systems biology also seeks to understand biology at the or-
ganism and tissue level, but this Note will focus only on the concept as applied 
to the cellular system. 
 64. Id. 
 65. The close reliance of epigenetics-based inventions on cellular features 
and interactions obscures the Mayo analysis, as discussed in Part II.B. 
 66. Carrie Deans & Keith A. Maggert, What Do You Mean, “Epigenetic”?, 
199 GENETICS 887, 892 (2015). Some confusion exists regarding how to properly 
define epigenetics, but Dean and Maggert suggest limiting the definition to her-
itable, chromosome-bound changes to avoid unnecessary overlap between epi-
genetics and extracellular gene regulation. See id. 
 67. WHAT IS EPIGENETICS, Epigenetics: Fundamentals, https://www 
.whatisepigenetics.com/fundamentals (last visited Apr. 19, 2018); see ALBERTS 
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gene expression alter how often a cell reads the gene, while sub-
stantive changes alter the gene itself, and therefore the protein 
for which the gene codes.68 Differential gene expression has al-
lowed scientists to explain how all cells contain the same genes, 
yet carry out drastically different functions; they express genes 
differently.69 By limiting itself to chromosome-bound changes, 
epigenetics only examines heritable changes to gene expression 
(changes that can be passed to one’s children) that originate on 
or near the gene itself.70 
Though many such changes originate near genes, this Sub-
section will limit its discussion to two major epigenetic mecha-
nisms that are considered in Part II’s application of the Mayo 
test: chromatin structure and DNA methylation. Like many 
other interactions identified through systems biology, the inter-
actions that control chromatin structure and DNA methylation 
are evolutionarily-optimized and not receptive to transfor-
mation. The complexity and intricacy of these epigenetic mecha-
nisms rely on the standardization of histone modifications, just 
as the DNA-RNA-protein relationship relies on the standardiza-
tion of nucleotides and amino acids. Together, these mechanisms 
form an evolutionarily optimized system of interactions (the his-
tone code) that controls heritable changes in gene expression—a 
system that cannot easily be altered. 
The structure of chromatin, the DNA-protein complex pre-
sent in the nucleus of eukaryotic cells, determines how loosely or 
compactly DNA is condensed.71 This complex exists for the pri-
mary purpose of condensing DNA down to a storable size by 
 
ET AL., supra note 29, at 6–7. Because regulatory genes moderate the expression 
of other genes, substantive changes to regulatory genes often interest epigeneti-
cists studying the expression of the regulated genes. See Deans & Maggert, su-
pra note 66, at 890–91 (discussing the impact of sequence changes in regulatory 
genes). 
 68. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 29 at 6–7. Substantively changing a 
gene involves substituting, adding, or deleting nucleotides from the DNA se-
quence, which may or may not alter the amino acid sequence of the protein the 
gene codes for, depending on the substantive change made. See id. at 6–7 
(“[T]here are many cases in which several codons correspond to the same amino 
acid.”). Gene expression describes how often the cell transcribes the gene. See 
id. 
 69. See id. at 1171. Higher transcription of a gene creates many RNA cop-
ies, which in turn cause the cell to create many copies of the protein the gene 
codes for. See id. at 372 (“[A] cell can control the proteins it makes by . . . con-
trolling when and how often a given gene is transcribed . . . .”). 
 70. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 29, at 194 (“DNA is packaged into nu-
cleosomes to create a chromatin fiber . . . .”). 
 71. Id. at 187. 
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“coil[ing] and fold[ing] the DNA into higher and higher levels of 
organization.”72 If all DNA from a human cell were stretched 
end-to-end, it would measure two meters in length, but chroma-
tin condensing allows it to fit inside a microscopic nucleus.73 Ep-
igeneticists show interest in chromatin structure for multiple 
reasons: (1) high levels of gene expression accompany areas of 
low DNA condensation (loose chromatin or “euchromatin”);74 (2) 
DNA condensation differs across locations on a chromosome and 
over the course of the cell cycle;75 and (3) chromatin patterns are 
often inherited.76 So, how does chromatin work? 
Chromatin consists of DNA, histones, and other proteins, 
but the primary determinant of DNA condensation is histones.77 
Histones are a family of proteins, each shaped like a ball with a 
tail, that serve as monomers.78 Eight histones combine to form a 
nucleosome (an eight-subunit complex or “octamer”) around 
DNA roughly every two hundred nucleotides, creating the ap-
pearance of “beads on a string.”79 Chemical modifications to the 
nucleosomes, both on histone cores and protruding tails, deter-
mine how they interact with DNA and neighboring nucleo-
somes.80 Certain modifications promote loose chromatin and 
high gene expression, while others promote condensed chroma-
tin and low gene expression.81 Often, other proteins control the 
addition or removal of chemical modifications, making most 
modifications reversible.82 Histones also contribute to chromatin 
regulation through the different effects each different histone 
monomer has on DNA condensation.83 Together, the chemical 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. See id. at 179. 
 74. Id. at 194–95 (discussing the silencing effect of heterochromatin). 
 75. See id. at 187, 194, 196–97. 
 76. Id. at 194. 
 77. Id. at 187. 
 78. Id. at 187–89. 
 79. Id. at 187–88. 
 80. Id. at 196–97. Common covalent modifications include “the acetylation 
of lysines, the mono-, di-, and trimethylation of lysines, and the phosphorylation 
of serines.” Id. at 196. 
 81. Id. at 196–98. The acetylation of lysines removes positive charges, 
which reduces nucleosome affinity for each other, causing them to spread out, 
loosen the chromatin, and allow transcription in those DNA regions. See id. at 
197. Trimethylation of a lysine on the histone H3 tail recruits HP1, which con-
denses DNA further and reduces transcription. See id. 
 82. Id. at 196. 
 83. See id. at 198–99. 
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modifications and histone variants create meaningful combina-
tions that epigeneticists have termed the “histone code.”84 These 
very specific combinations instruct cell machinery to repair chro-
matin, increase gene expression, or decrease gene expression.85 
But other combinations, such as nonnatural ones a researcher 
may wish to introduce, would not be recognized without signifi-
cantly altering the cell machinery. 
Apart from chromatin structure, the other main epigenetic 
mechanism is DNA methylation.86 This chemical modification, 
the addition of a methyl group, is made directly on DNA strands 
to prevent cell machinery from recognizing the gene.87 In most 
scenarios, this blocking effect reduces gene expression by pre-
venting transcription factor proteins from binding and starting 
transcription.88 Occasionally the blocking effect actually in-
creases gene expression by preventing repressor proteins from 
binding to the gene.89 DNA methylation also impacts gene ex-
pression by recruiting histone-modifying proteins that promote 
DNA condensation, which also hinders transcription.90 As with 
chemical modifications to histones, a series of proteins exist to 
add and remove the methyl group from target genes, making this 
epigenetic mechanism reversible and therefore a potential tool 
that researchers may wish to manipulate into epigenetics-based 
treatments.91 
Epigenetic features interest scientists because their suscep-
tibility to environmental impact and heritability make them 
likely to play an essential role in personalized medicine. Envi-
ronmental factors such as heat or diet can impact DNA methyl-
ation patterns and histone modifications at any stage of life, both 
during gestation and after birth.92 Because DNA methylation 
and histone modifications can be inherited, these environmental 
 
 84. Id. at 198. 
 85. See id. 
 86. See Joseph Loscalzo & Diane E. Handy, Epigenetic Modifications: Basic 
Mechanisms and Role in Cardiovascular Disease, 123 CIRCULATION 2145, 2145–
46 (2011) (discussing DNA methylation as an epigenetic tag). 
 87. Id. at 2145. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 2146. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See generally Robert Feil & Mario F. Fraga, Epigenetics and the Envi-
ronment: Emerging Patterns and Implications, 13 NATURE REV. GENETICS 97 
(2012) (describing how environmental factors impact epigenetic features in both 
plants and animals at various stages of development). 
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effects could last generations.93 Each person’s epigenetic fea-
tures differ based on their own inheritance and environment, 
making future epigenetic applications distinctly personal in na-
ture. Epigenetic diseases have already been identified, and the 
development of reliable diagnostics might allow for personalized 
“behavioral or nutritional advice.”94 Epigenetics may also allow 
options for “drug targeting and discovery,” or even the creation 
of an anticancer drug that “reactivat[es] tumor-suppressor genes 
with the use of demethylating agents.”95 
It is important, however, to note a key limitation of epige-
netics; it exemplifies a field of biotechnology that cannot readily 
utilize synthetic components. Just as DNA, RNA, and protein 
rely on standardized components to ensure accurate transcrip-
tion and translation, the histone code and DNA methylation rely 
on a very specific set of interactions to correctly manage gene 
expression. The mammalian histone code relies on at least fif-
teen specific sets of histone modifications, not simply fifteen mod-
ifications, to manage expression.96 Additionally, histone proteins 
themselves “are among the most highly conserved eukaryotic 
proteins.”97 In other words, their function is so fundamental that 
histones in all eukaryotes, from single-celled organisms to hu-
mans, share a highly similar structure despite hundreds of mil-
lions of years of evolution. Like most components of biological 
systems, epigenetic mechanisms are not easily replaceable with 
synthetic components. 
II.  APPLYING THE MAYO TEST TO EPIGENETICS: THE 
DIFFERENT CHALLENGES IMPOSED BY STEPS ONE AND 
TWO   
This Part examines how applying the Mayo test to epigenet-
ics-based inventions results in inconsistent patent eligibility de-
terminations. It begins by arguing that recent rulings make ep-
igenetics-based technology categorically directed to either 
 
 93. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 29, at 413 (noting that “inherited forms 
of DNA methylation and . . . chromatin condensation [are] additional mecha-
nisms for generating cell memory of gene expression patterns”). Cells actually 
assemble new, identical nucleosomes in a similarly semiconservative manner 
as DNA replication occurs. See id. at 261–62 (detailing the process of nucleo-
some assembly behind the replication fork). 
 94. Ruth Chadwick & Alan O’Connor, Epigenetics and Personalized Medi-
cine: Prospects and Ethical Issues, 10 PERSONALIZED MED. 463, 464 (2013). 
 95. Id. 
 96. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 29, at 198. 
 97. Id. at 190. 
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natural phenomena or laws, conditioning patent eligibility on 
the outcome of step two. It then identifies the type of questions 
judges must answer when deciding whether each epigenetics-
based invention sufficiently transforms underlying natural phe-
nomena or laws. Part II concludes that the judiciary’s lack of 
technical expertise and the inapplicability of prior art leave 
judges without the context necessary to make consistent § 101 
rulings on epigenetics-based technology. 
A. EPIGENETICS-BASED TECHNOLOGY MAY BE CATEGORICALLY 
DIRECTED TO NATURAL PHENOMENA OR NATURAL LAWS 
As set forth in Part I, the non application of the Mayo test 
in Myriad left an open question: can a claim be directed to a nat-
ural phenomenon when not expressly claiming a natural prod-
uct?98 The Federal Circuit answered this question affirmatively 
in Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., ruling that a 
method for detecting cell-free fetal DNA (cffDNA) was directed 
to naturally occurring cffDNA.99 This ruling significantly broad-
ens the natural phenomena exception to patent eligible subject 
matter, threatening patent rights for all biotechnology.100 The 
Mayo decision similarly expanded the natural-law exception.101 
There, the Court found a method of treating gastrointestinal dis-
orders directed to a natural law because the claim utilized the 
natural “relationships between concentrations of certain metab-
olites in the blood and the likelihood that a dosage of a thiopu-
rine drug will prove ineffective or cause harm.”102 
These expansions of the natural-phenomena and natural-
law exceptions almost certainly make epigenetics-based inven-
tions categorically directed to ineligible subject matter, because 
virtually all epigenetics-based technology utilizes natural phe-
nomena and/or natural associations or correlations that courts 
 
 98. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 99. 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Cell-free fetal DNA is a type of fetal 
DNA that can be detected in the pregnant mother ’s bloodstream by the diag-
nostic test being considered by the Federal Circuit. Id. at 1373. For the purposes 
of this Note, readers need only understand that cffDNA is a natural phenome-
non. 
 100. Cf. Merksamer, supra note 32, at 521–25 (arguing that the ruling jeop-
ardizes the patent eligibility of DNA diagnostic tests). 
 101. Id. at 509. 
 102. Mayo Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 77 (2012). 
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would now consider natural laws.103 Epigenetics-based technol-
ogy works by understanding the relevance of gene locations, the 
histone code, chemical modifications to DNA, chromatin conden-
sation and the relationships between gene expression levels and 
other cellular features. This reliance of epigenetics-based tech-
nology on naturally occurring features makes the directed-to 
standard from step one of the Mayo test especially problem-
atic.104 After Mayo, methods that diagnose epigenetic diseases 
based on that understanding would be directed towards the nat-
ural correlations between epigenetic features, gene expression 
and disease. After Ariosa, methods of detecting or altering epi-
genetic features would be directed towards those features, just 
as the method of detecting cffDNA in Ariosa was directed to 
cffDNA. These rulings also suggest that a claimed biological ap-
paratus or large biomolecule that utilizes epigenetic features, 
such as a vector for gene insertion that targets only noncon-
densed DNA regions, would be directed to the features its func-
tion depends on.105 Thus virtually all epigenetics-based technol-
ogy is directed to ineligible subject matter and must undergo 
Mayo step two. 
 
 103. Software faces an almost identical problem, where courts consider most 
software patents directed to abstract ideas. In Enfish and D.D.R. Holdings, the 
first Federal Circuit cases to distinguish Alice, the court found that the patent 
claims were directed to a specific improvement or problem, despite using an 
abstract idea. Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft, Inc., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(holding that the claims were directed towards making a specific improvement 
to database functionality); D.D.R. Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 
773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that the claims were directed to solving 
a specific problem unique to the digital world). Unfortunately for those seeking 
to patent epigenetics-based inventions, these rulings do not appear easily anal-
ogous. The Enfish ruling for a specific improvement seemingly holds potential, 
but the practical constraints on altering epigenetic features while preserving 
natural functionality will limit its applicability. The D.D.R. Holdings ruling 
concerning a problem unique to the digital world appears inapplicable to bio-
technology because the biological world is natural, not man-made like the digi-
tal world. Thus, directing an invention to a specific, naturally occurring biolog-
ical problem would still direct it towards a natural phenomenon. 
 104. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014). 
 105. In molecular biology, vector refers to “[a] vehicle . . . used to transfer . . . 
genetic material such as DNA sequences from the donor organism to the target 
cell of the recipient organism.” Vector, BIOLOGY ONLINE, http://www 
.biology-online.org/dictionary/Vector (last updated June 16, 2010). 
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B. IDENTIFYING A SUFFICIENT TRANSFORMATION UNDER MAYO 
STEP TWO INVOLVES ASKING NUANCED QUESTIONS ABOUT 
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 
Given the strong likelihood that courts will consider epige-
netics-based technology categorically directed to ineligible sub-
ject matter, patent eligibility will depend on the second step of 
the analysis: whether the invention contains an inventive con-
cept sufficient to transform it into a patentable invention.106 Un-
fortunately, the close relation between epigenetics-based tech-
nology and underlying natural phenomena or laws obscures this 
analysis. Though “all inventions at some level embody, use, re-
flect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or 
abstract ideas,”107 epigenetics relies on natural features, inter-
actions, and correlations to an exceptional degree, even among 
fields of biotechnology.108 It cannot readily utilize synthetic biol-
ogy tools that clearly distinguish inventions from their underly-
ing subject matter.109 Accordingly, resolving Mayo step two for 
epigenetics-based inventions requires examining subtle distinc-
tions between the invention and its underlying subject matter, 
making the analysis akin to separating shades of gray. To high-
light the subtlety of the distinctions that must be drawn, one 
must consider what types of modifications, and what extent of 
modification, would be necessary to transform an epigenetically 
relevant, naturally occurring protein into a patent eligible inven-
tion.110 Three types of alterations to consider include: (1) use in 
a nonnatural context; (2) chemical modification after transla-
tion; and (3) change to the protein’s amino acid sequence.111 
An epigenetically relevant protein could be used outside its 
natural context in many ways. Molecular biologists often use 
natural proteins in cells where the proteins are not naturally 
 
 106. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73. 
 107. Id. at 71. 
 108. See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text. 
 109. Id. 
 110. A similar question regarding type and extent of modification could be 
asked for most inventions in the field of molecular biology. For the purposes of 
this Note, the discussion will limit itself to epigenetics. Nevertheless, it is im-
portant to note that courts may similarly struggle to define minimum transfor-
mation when examining biotechnology beyond epigenetics. 
 111. A nonnatural context would not alter the protein in any way, whereas 
chemical modification or amino acid changes would alter its structure. Any im-
pact on the protein’s function would depend on the extent of contextual change, 
chemical modification, or amino acid sequence changes. 
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present.112 Given the stark differences between bacteria and hu-
man cells, using a bacterial protein in a human cell would likely 
be transformative.113 While a good starting point, it does not de-
fine the line of minimum transformation that will give rise to 
patent eligibility. Does the use of the protein stop being trans-
formative when the natural protein comes from a eukaryotic mi-
croorganism, a mammal, a primate, or a human? If the protein 
is a histone, how does the fact that eukaryotic histones share 
highly similar structures affect the analysis? Could it be suffi-
ciently transformative to use a human nonhistone protein natu-
rally expressed only in one cell type in another cell type? Also, 
consider uses of natural proteins in an in-vitro setting: Does us-
ing a natural histone in a diagnostic for epigenetic disease give 
rise to patentability, despite the diagnostic’s dependence on 
recognition of the histone code? What if the diagnostic utilizes 
multiple natural nonhistone proteins that respond to the histone 
code in different ways? 
Chemical and amino acid changes also invoke questions 
about what constitutes a minimum transformation. Is it trans-
formative to change a protein’s structure, but not its function? 
Do changes sufficiently transform the protein if they change how 
well the protein functions, but not how it carries out that func-
tion? What if the changes add a new function, but leave the nat-
ural function unaffected? As an example, consider chemical and 
amino acid modifications to histone-modifying proteins. Does a 
sufficient transformation occur if the protein structure changes, 
even though it still modifies histones the same way? What if the 
changes reduce the rate of histone modification by fifty percent? 
What if the protein no longer modifies histones, but still recog-
nizes and binds to them? 
Imagine an inventor wanted to identify condensed chroma-
tin by creating a protein that binds to areas of high DNA meth-
ylation and is visible under a fluorescent microscope.114 This in-
ventor would begin with a protein that recognized DNA 
 
 112. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 29, at 495–98 (describing how microbi-
ologists create genetically engineered, or “transgenic,” organisms by deleting or 
replacing genes). 
 113. Bacteria are prokaryotic, making them extremely dissimilar to hu-
mans, which have eukaryotic cells. See id. at 12–13 (listing differences between 
prokaryotic and eukaryotic cells). 
 114. Fluorescent tagging proteins are highly common and easy to construct. 
See id. at 539. Such a hybrid protein likely would fail the obviousness test, but 
that is irrelevant to whether the subject matter would itself be patent eligible. 
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methylation and modify it, using other naturally occurring pro-
teins as blueprints. At what point would this protein become pa-
tent eligible? If the inventor combined natural protein with a 
synthetic sequence that resulted in fluorescence, it would likely 
be considered transformed. But what if she combined natural 
protein with another natural protein that fluoresced? What if the 
second natural protein came from a different species, and the 
combination would never occur naturally? 
This Section poses many questions, but intentionally offers 
few answers in the belief that no definite answers exist. It is im-
portant to pose these questions regardless, as judges must an-
swer the same or analogous questions when engaging in a § 101 
inquiry for a modified biomolecule. Even epigenetics experts 
could reasonably disagree as to whether a given type or extent 
of modification sufficiently transforms subject matter into a pa-
tentable invention. But judges, not experts, make the patent el-
igibility determination, and they do so lacking an understanding 
of both the subject matter and the scientific field. 
 
C. WITHOUT TECHNICAL EXPERTISE OR GUIDANCE FROM PRIOR 
ART, JUDGES LACK THE ABILITY TO MAKE CONSISTENT § 101 
RULINGS ON EPIGENETICS-BASED TECHNOLOGY 
The questions set forth above demonstrate the judicial need 
for scientific context when deciding whether an epigenetics-
based invention sufficiently transforms the underlying subject 
matter. “[T]he judge has to understand [the scientific] back-
ground just to get to the factual basis of the problem and then 
deal with legal aspects.”115 Few judges possess that understand-
ing, with only five percent having studied any type of science.116 
Justice Scalia recognized this deficiency regarding molecular bi-
ology, concurring with the majority in Myriad solely to note that 
he “join[ed] the judgment of the Court, and all of its opinion ex-
cept . . . some portions of the rest of the opinion going into fine 
details of molecular biology. I am unable to affirm those details 
 
 115. Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 4 (2010) 
(quoting Hon. James F. Holderman speaking about patent litigation generally). 
 116. Jules Epstein, When Must Lawyers Learn Science?, NAT’L JUDICIAL 
COLL.: THE JUDICIAL EDGE (Jan. 21, 2016) http://www.judges.org/when-must 
-lawyers-learn-science. 
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on my own knowledge or even my own belief.”117 Some would ar-
gue that it is the job of attorneys to educate judges on the tech-
nology at issue and that their tutorials adequately prepare 
judges to grapple with difficult subject matter.118 This reasoning 
assumes that judges freely embrace science-heavy tutorials, 
which seems unlikely given “[t]he discomfort of the legal profes-
sion, including the judiciary, with science and technology.”119 
Even Congress, by allowing the USPTO to use a different stand-
ard of proof, seems to imply that fact-intensive patent issues are 
better handled by those familiar with the technical subject mat-
ter. District court judges may only invalidate patents based on 
clear and convincing evidence, but the USPTO may invalidate 
based on a mere preponderance of the evidence.120  
The judiciary’s lack of scientific knowledge proves especially 
troublesome in § 101 challenges because judges decide patent el-
igibility as a question of law, with the inquiry focused exclusively 
on the patent’s claims.121 Courts “consider the elements of each 
 
 117. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 
596 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 118. Erin Coe, Program for Patent Judges Could Cut Case Delays, LAW360 
(Apr. 3, 2009), https://www.law360.com/articles/95376/program-for-patent 
-judges-could-cut-case-delays. 
 119. Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 788 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Id. at 787–
88 (discussing the “widespread, and increasingly troublesome, discomfort 
among lawyers and judges confronted by a scientific or other technological is-
sue”); Lee, supra note 115, at 20–25 (arguing that the judiciary takes cognitive 
shortcuts consistent with the “cognitive miser” model when attempting to un-
derstand science, as illustrated by their “use of metaphors to understand new 
technologies”). Concerns over the judiciary’s inadequacies regarding patent 
cases has motivated Congress to pass a pilot program which experiments with 
specialized patent courts. See Coe, supra note 118 (“A pilot program allowing 
for some federal judges to sharpen their expertise in patent law could help whit-
tle down pending cases and speed up patent litigation[—]a process that practi-
tioners say has become painfully slow.”); see also MARGARET S. WILLIAMS, RE-
BECCA EYRE, & JOE CECIL, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PATENT PILOT PROGRAM: FIVE-
YEAR REPORT 1 (2016) (describing the structure of the Patent Pilot Program), 
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2016/Patent%20Pilot%20Program%20 
Five-Year%20Report%20(2016).pdf. 
 120. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016). Inter 
partes reviews, which allow challenging a patent on novelty or obviousness 
grounds, are conducted before USPTO examiners who have some level of exper-
tise in the subject matter. Inter Partes Review, USPTO, https://www.uspto 
.gov/patents-application-process/appealing-patent-decisions/trials/inter-partes 
-review (last modified May 9, 2017). While Article III judges decide patent is-
sues using a clear and convincing evidence standard, the examiners need only 
decide them by a mere preponderance of the evidence. Cuozzo, 126 S. Ct. at 
2144. 
 121. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014). 
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claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to deter-
mine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of 
the claim.’”122 This narrow focus on claim language causes prob-
lems by excluding prior art from the analysis, which eliminates 
another source of scientific knowledge from consideration.123 In 
the novelty and obviousness doctrines, judges compare the pa-
tent-in-suit to closely related patents and publications (the 
“prior art”) to determine whether its invention is new124 and non-
obvious.125 Though judges make § 101 determinations without a 
comparison, prior art references could inform judges about 
closely related inventions in the field, helping them develop an 
understanding of both the subject matter and what inventive 
contribution the patent-in-suit might be making. 
Because epigenetics-based technology often blurs the line 
between invention and underlying natural phenomena and laws, 
judges already face a difficult task when making § 101 determi-
nations.126 Absent background knowledge of molecular biology 
or context from prior art, how can the judiciary hope to under-
stand, much less consistently answer, any of the questions posed 
in Part II.B?127 With difficult subject matter, varying levels of 
background knowledge, and minimal context for the invention, 
one should expect judges to make inconsistent decisions regard-
ing the patent eligibility of epigenetics-based inventions. Absent 
an understanding of epigenetics-based technology, we should ex-
pect courts to differ with regards to where they set the line of 
minimum transformation. The inconsistency arises not because 
the judiciary is incapable, but because the Mayo test requires 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. Another problem with focusing the § 101 inquiry exclusively on claim 
language is the judiciary’s poor performance when attempting to interpret the 
scope of patent claims. The Federal Circuit reverses claim construction rulings 
in roughly one-third of cases. Coe, supra note 118. Comparatively, “[c]laim con-
struction rulings by U.K. courts were overturned [only] 15 percent of the time.” 
Id. Some practitioners even report instances in which courts improperly ap-
proached patent claims like contract terms. Id. This poor performance contrib-
uted to Congress’s decision to begin the Patent Pilot Program, which tracks 
courts’ performance in deciding claim construction. See WILLIAMS, EYRE & 
CECIL, supra note 119, at 23–25 (detailing the results of Markman hearings for 
claim construction over the first five years of the pilot program). 
 124. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
 125. Id. § 103. 
 126. Judges must simultaneously combat the interpretive problems of trying 
to read Myriad, Alice, and Mayo together. See Burk, supra note 30, at 609–11 
(demonstrating the difficulty of combining the different frameworks used by the 
Supreme Court); supra Part II.A.  
 127. See supra notes 112–14 and accompanying text. 
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judges to define a “sufficient transformation” for complex subject 
matter in a vacuum, with no reference to prior art—a difficult 
task that none of the other patent doctrines require. 
III.  THE INADEQUACY OF INCONSISTENT PATENT 
RIGHTS AND ALTERNATIVES TO APPLYING MAYO TO 
BIOTECHNOLOGY   
This Part builds upon the inconsistent patent rights for ep-
igenetics-based technology likely to result from the Mayo test, 
arguing that the uncertainty of validity threatens to freeze in-
vestment and prevent acquisition of epigenetics start-ups, which 
would impede the process of bringing epigenetics-based technol-
ogy to markets. It then argues that categorically exempting epi-
genetics-based technology from § 101 would solve the uncer-
tainty problem without leading to patents “‘improperly tying up 
the’ . . . building blocks of human ingenuity.”128 
A. ALLOWING INCONSISTENT INVALIDATIONS UNDER § 101 
HARMS BIOTECHNOLOGY FIRMS AND HINDERS EPIGENETICS 
FROM ENTERING MEDICAL MARKETS QUICKLY 
Historically, biotechnology companies have relied on pa-
tents to protect their investments in research and development, 
perhaps more than any other industry.129 Pharmaceutical com-
panies helped drive this trend through their own patenting prac-
tices and their targeted acquisition of biotech start-ups. Epige-
netics start-ups appear to be following the same strategy, likely 
because it develops strong intellectual property assets that can 
later be leveraged during an acquisition or when attracting in-
vestors.130 This Section discusses the dominant biotech patent-
ing strategy, how it pays off for both the start-up and acquiring 
company in an acquisition, and why inconsistent § 101 invalida-
tions undermine it. 
 
 128. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quoting 
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1301 
(2012)). 
 129. Esteban Burrone, Patents at the Core: The Biotech Business, WIPO 
(2006), http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/patents_biotech_fulltext.html. 
 130. See id. (describing the importance of strong intellectual property assets 
to investors in biotech companies). 
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The biotech strategy of patenting early and frequently arises 
from the capital-intensive process of bringing a product to mar-
ket, which can best be demonstrated with pharmaceuticals.131 
Recent estimates place the total capitalized cost of bringing a 
drug to market at $2.558 billion.132 Capital covers not only the 
cost of creating the drug, but also the cost of conducting clinical 
trials, seeking FDA approval, and educating consumers and 
healthcare providers through marketing.133 Biotech firms incur 
these extreme costs only because patent monopolies ensure a re-
turn on their investment.134 Their aggressive pursuit of patents, 
sometimes more than six years prior to any drug in the class be-
ing approved,135 demonstrates just how essential they consider 
patents to their business model. 
For those developing epigenetics-based technology—often 
start-ups—the incentives to patent differ from those motivating 
large pharmaceutical companies. Epigenetics start-ups face 
many of the same capital requirements as pharmaceutical com-
panies, but lack the resources to ensure they can bring the prod-
uct to market. Accordingly, start-ups focus on shorter-term goals 
when patenting, each of which contributes to the start-up’s long-
term viability. Acquiring a patent serves as a deterrent to others 
who would otherwise assert their intellectual property against 
the start-up, the threat of countersuit serving as a form of mu-
tually assured destruction or an incentive to cross-license.136 Ad-
ditionally, patenting attracts investment and acquisition, which 
provides the resources to get technology to market.137 Only with 
acquisition or investment can the patented technology reach the 
 
 131. Pharmaceutical companies have escalated how early and frequently 
they patent in recent years. From 1998 to 2004, pharmaceutical companies only 
patented eighty percent of later-in-class drugs prior to the first-in-class drug’s 
approval, but between 2005 to 2011 that number increased to 100%. Joseph A. 
DiMasi & R. Chakravarthy, Competitive Development in Pharmacologic Clas-
ses: Market Entry and the Timing of Development, 100 CLINICAL PHARMACOL-
OGY & THERAPEUTICS 754, 757 (2016). 
 132. Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: 
New Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 26 (2016). DiMasi et al.’s 
estimate that the capitalized cost of bringing a drug to market has increased 
145% since 2003. Id. at 31. Almost half of this increase can be attributed to 
increasing drug failure rates. Id. at 28. 
 133. Emily Michiko Morris, The Myth of Generic Pharmaceutical Competi-
tion Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 245, 255–57 (2012). 
 134. Id. at 257. 
 135. DiMasi & Chakravarthy, supra note 131, at 758. 
 136. See Graham & Sichelman, supra note 16 at 1065–66. 
 137. Id. at 1067. 
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market and serve its ultimate purpose: recouping the start-up’s 
research and development costs. 
Though initial public offering (IPO) markets have been 
promising for biotechnology,138 most start-ups follow the acqui-
sition track to obtain resources and regulatory expertise from 
large pharmaceutical companies.139 Epigenetics start-ups, such 
as Epizyme, have already begun to seek out buyers.140 Leverag-
ing a larger company’s resources and regulatory expertise less-
ens the burden of a grueling FDA approval process, allowing 
technology to reach markets more quickly.141 At the same time, 
large pharmaceutical companies have moved away from re-
search and development and towards acquisition because they 
can “acquire potential [sic] commercially viable products that 
can shave years off of R&D effort.”142 This trend might also be 
linked to the steady increase in research and development costs 
over recent years, resulting from decreases in drug success 
rates.143 In other words, acquiring a biotech start-up may be a 
more certain and cost-effective investment than performing 
one’s own research and development. 
Patent eligibility invalidations and the resulting uncer-
tainty in patent rights undercut this trend in multiple ways. 
First, the uncertainty of successfully asserting the patent 
 
 138. See Percy H. Carter et al., Investigating Investment in Biopharmaceu-
tical R&D, 15 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 673, 674 (2016) (“The opti-
mism stems from the clear indication that investors are still willing to back 
projects and companies that have advanced to the preclinical stage.”). 
 139. Mary Ann Rafferty, Managing Change in Biotech: Mergers and Acqui-
sitions, 25 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 689, 689 (2007). Assuming DiMasi et al.’s 
estimates on the increasing costs of drug development are correct, see DiMasi 
et al., supra note 132, pharmaceutical companies’ growing interest in acquisi-
tion likely stems from the relative certainty, and therefore cost-effectiveness, of 
an acquired product vis-à-vis internal development.  
 140. Luke Timmerman, Celgene Emerges as Biotech’s Shrewdest, Nimblest 
Dealmaker, EXOME: BIOBEAT (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.xconomy.com/national/ 
2013/08/05/celgene-emerges-as-biotechs-savviest-nimblest-dealmaker. 
 141. Rafferty, supra note 139 (“[B]iotechs are often eager to gain regulatory 
and marketing expertise—both of which are big pharma’s strengths.”). 
 142. Id; see also Timmerman, supra note 140 (”Celgene has gotten its hooks 
into some of the . . . leaders in epigenetic-based drug development, cancer me-
tabolism, antibody drugs, gene therapy, immunotherapy, and regenerative 
medicine. If even one-fourth or one-fifth of these companies do what they say 
they are aspiring to do, Celgene will win big.”).  
 143. See generally DiMasi et al., supra note 132 (discussing new costs esti-
mates of drug research and development). Accounting for inflation, the capital-
ized cost per approved drug grew 8.5% per year from 2005 to 2013. Id. at 26. 
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greatly reduces its deterrence value,144 reducing incentives for 
competing start-ups to cross-license and making lawsuits more 
likely.145 Uncertain patent rights also reduce the appeal of in-
vestment and acquisition of biotech start-ups, as investors lack 
certainty that they can recoup their investment or acquisition 
costs when the technology eventually reaches the market. With 
many investments or acquisitions occurring before any clinical 
testing begins,146 the larger company must still spend hundreds 
of millions of dollars before the product reaches markets. It 
makes little sense to incur both acquisition and development 
costs if the patent cannot exclude competitors. Research already 
indicates underinvestment in IPOs for large-molecule biologics, 
a category that includes certain forms of epigenetics-based tech-
nology.147 Though it remains unclear whether uncertain patent 
rights contribute to this underinvestment,148 pharmaceutical 
companies’ need for “a healthy, big pipeline to fuel [them],” made 
up of “the highest science [and] novelty” should ensure that the 
market for acquiring biotech start-ups does not disappear, even 
if the lack of consistently enforceable patent rights does make it 
less robust.149 
Unfortunately, a less robust market for biotech investment 
and acquisition may still irreparably harm newer fields of bio-
technology, like epigenetics. A limited market for investment 
discourages epigenetics-based start-ups from forming, which in 
turn limits the innovation in the field. Large pharmaceutical 
companies “pick up . . . groundbreaking treatments” from start-
ups, specifically looking for ones that can be disruptive to the 
 
 144. Graham & Sichelman, supra note 16, at 1080 (“[W]hen it is very likely 
the defendant would be able to show . . . that the asserted patents are invalid 
or unenforceable—the patent system may not function optimally because of the 
high costs and uncertainty of patent litigation.”). 
 145. See id. at 1076–77, 79–80 (discussing the leverage a strong patent port-
folio provides in licensing scenarios and as a deterrence to litigation). 
 146. See Timmerman, supra note 140 (explaining that most of Celgene’s ac-
quisitions occurred when the smaller company “had technology still in preclini-
cal testing”). 
 147. See Carter et al., supra note 138, at 674. Investors prefer small mole-
cules over biologics at the pre-clinical phase, despite biologics having a net pre-
sent value “2.5-fold higher” than small molecules. Id. 
 148. Researchers suggest that the underinvestment may occur either be-
cause “investors may not be sophisticated enough to form an efficient public 
market for a space as complex as biopharmaceuticals,” or because investors “are 
focused on their ‘exit’ and not on the ultimate marketing of the compound.” Id. 
 149. Timmerman, supra note 140 (quoting George Golumbeski, Celgene’s 
senior vice president of business development, regarding Celgene’s approach to 
acquisitions and investment). 
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field.150 With fewer epigenetics start-ups, one can expect fewer 
novel treatments for serious epigenetic diseases that currently 
lack a cure, such as Prader-Willi Syndrome, Angelman’s Syn-
drome, and ATR-X Syndrome.151 Those epigenetics start-ups 
that do move forward may encounter pharmaceutical companies 
no longer willing to invest or acquire technology in preclinical 
stages. Investing or acquiring at a later stage somewhat offsets 
the risk of patent invalidity,152 as clinical-phase technology is 
usually more proven than preclinical technology. Entrance at a 
later stage also lessens the investor’s financial burden in bring-
ing the technology to market, further offsetting the risk of patent 
invalidity. While delaying acquisition or investment decreases 
risk for investors, it also places a heavy burden on epigenetics 
start-ups, who must begin the FDA approval process without fi-
nancial backing or regulatory expertise. Accordingly, any treat-
ments or technology developed by epigenetics start-ups will be 
delayed in reaching markets. 
Whether the inconsistency of patent rights manifests itself 
in a lack of innovative epigenetics technology or a delay in bring-
ing that technology to market, it inflicts an unacceptable harm 
on a growing field of technology. Epigenetic technology not only 
combats epigenetic diseases, but also holds the potential to ex-
pand personalized medicine, provide individualized cancer treat-
ments, and assist with drug targeting.153 In an age where fund-
ing and regulatory compliance serve as major hurdles to 
 
 150. Id. 
 151. Symptoms of Prader-Willi Syndrome, which results from deletions on 
chromosome 15, include life-threatening obesity, delays in intellectual develop-
ment, and difficulty controlling emotions. Prader-Willi Syndrome (PWS): Con-
dition Information, NAT’L INST. HEALTH, https://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/ 
topics/prader-willi/conditioninfo/default (last updated Dec. 1, 2016). Angelman 
Syndrome causes “developmental delay and neurological problems” as early as 
six months into a child’s life, and later causes seizures. Angelman Syndrome 
Information Page, NAT’L INST. NEUROLOGICAL DISORDERS & STROKE, https:// 
www.ninds.nih.gov/Disorders/All-Disorders/Angelman-Syndrome-Information 
-Page (last visited Apr. 19, 2017). Alpha Thalassemia X-Linked Intellectual Dis-
ability Syndrome (ATR-X) not only impairs development and intellectual abili-
ties, but also causes a blood disorder, skeletal anomalies, and genital abnormal-
ities. Alpha Thalassemia X-Linked Intellectual Disability Syndrome, GENETICS 
HOME REFERENCE (Apr. 7, 2017), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/alpha 
-thalassemia-x-linked-intellectual-disability-syndrome. 
 152. See Carter et al. supra note 138, at 673 (demonstrating that net present 
valuations increase dramatically when conducted at later stages of develop-
ment). 
 153. See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text. 
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bringing these advancements to market, biotech start-ups’ abil-
ity to provide patients with new treatments depends on their at-
tractiveness to investors. Patent law should help start-ups at-
tract investors and acquiring companies, not act as an 
impediment. 
B. CATEGORICALLY EXEMPTING EPIGENETICS FROM § 101 AND 
RELYING ON OBVIOUSNESS UNDER § 103 OR THE EUROPEAN 
PATENT OFFICE’S INVENTIVE-STEP STANDARD TO CLEAR PATENT 
THICKETS WOULD LEAD TO MORE CONSISTENT PATENT RIGHTS 
This Section presents an easily implemented solution to the 
inconsistent patent rights resulting from the Mayo test: categor-
ically exempting epigenetics from § 101. It argues that the Su-
preme Court’s concern in adopting the Mayo test, that patents 
would “‘improperly t[ie] up the’ . . . building blocks of human in-
genuity,”154 can be adequately addressed for epigenetics-based 
technology through the obviousness doctrine. It also addresses a 
potential problem arising from the TRIPS Agreement—which 
sets global intellectual property standards for World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) members—by offering a variant of this solu-
tion in which a European inventive-step analysis replaces the 
Mayo test for epigenetics.155 
1. Categorically Exempting Epigenetics-Based Technology 
from § 101 Resolves the Inconsistency Problem and Falls Well 
Within Congressional Authority 
Considering the various problems with applying the Mayo 
test to epigenetics-based technology identified in Part II, count-
less adjustments could be made to the doctrine. This Note argues 
that the simplest solution is the best: categorically exempting 
epigenetics-based technology from § 101. Unlike other potential 
solutions, such as the introduction of prior art to the analysis or 
requiring a court-appointed technical expert for each § 101 de-
termination, categorical exemption ensures both that the solu-
tion does not convolute patent eligibility doctrine further and 
that patent rights for epigenetics-based technology become con-
sistently enforceable. In other words, categorical exemption 
 
 154. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quoting 
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1301 
(2012)). 
 155. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
Preamble, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (ex-
pressing a desire to reduce intellectual property-related trade disputes). 
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serves as a cure to the inconsistent patent rights problem, not a 
band-aid that merely mitigates it. 
This solution also has the advantage of being practical. The 
constitutional authority to define patentable subject matter, in-
cluding declaring certain subject matter patent eligible, resides 
with Congress.156 Based on recent events, there may even be con-
gressional support for a categorical exemption of epigenetics-
based technology from § 101. Justice Frankfurter noted in 1943 
that it was already “an old observation that the training of An-
glo-American judges ill fits them to discharge the duties cast 
upon them by patent legislation.”157 Yet only recently did Con-
gress seek to remedy the problem, “steering cases to judges who 
have an interest in them” through a patent pilot program.158 Es-
tablished in early 2011, the program experiments with special-
ized patent courts by examining outcomes from thirteen pilot 
districts over a ten-year period.159 This legislation constitutes 
congressional acknowledgement of what Justice Frankfurter 
noted over seventy years ago: that judges are ill-equipped to han-
dle certain patent matters. 
Recent events around Capitol Hill also indicate congres-
sional interest in strengthening bio-pharma patents specifically. 
Powerful lobbying organizations representing bio-pharma have 
advocated for a similar categorical exemption that would exclude 
certain bio-pharma patents from postgrant proceedings at the 
USPTO.160 Responding to these requests, Congresswoman Mimi 
Walters, a member of the House Judiciary Committee, intro-
duced an amendment that would exempt certain pharmaceutical 
 
 156. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting power to congress to 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries”). 
 157. Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Am. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 60–61 
(1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 158. Coe, supra note 118. 
 159. WILLIAMS, EYRE & CECIL, supra note 119, at 1. 
 160. The Biotechnology Industry Organization and PhRMA sent a joint let-
ter to the Senate and House Judiciary Committees arguing that allowing bio-
pharma patents to be challenged in inter partes reviews, a common post-grant 
proceeding, “threatens to disrupt the careful balance that Congress achieved 
over 30 years ago” when it passed legislation outlining how biopharmaceutical 
patent litigation should proceed. Letter from James C. Greenwood, President & 
CEO, Biotechnology Indus. Org., & John J. Castellani, President & CEO, 
Pharm. Research Mfrs. Am., to Chuck Grassley, Chairman, Senate Judiciary 
Comm., & Robert Goodlatte, Chairman, House Judiciary Comm. (July 15, 2015), 
http://www.ptabwatch.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/630/2015/09/Final_Joint_ 
Phrma_Bio_Letter_on_IPR_071515.pdf.  
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patents from Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) proceed-
ings.161 Rep. Walters eventually withdrew the amendment after 
opposition from committee chairmen Rep. Robert Goodlatte. 
However, Chairmen Goodlatte later remarked that he thought 
everyone agreed with Rep. Walters, but that the amendment 
“was too complex to resolve in the markup session.”162 
2. In the Absence of a § 101 Requirement, Obviousness or 
European Inventive-Step Doctrines Adequately Address the 
Supreme Court’s Concerns and Provide a Means to Avoid 
Violating the TRIPS Agreement 
Though categorically exempting epigenetics-based technol-
ogy from § 101 provides a straightforward solution that recent 
events indicate may be Congressionally popular, two important 
questions remain. First, how does this solution address the Su-
preme Court’s “‘repeatedly emphasized . . . concern that patent 
law not inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the fu-
ture use of’ these building blocks of human ingenuity?”163 Sec-
ond, would the categorical exemption constitute “discrimination 
as to . . . the field of technology,” which the TRIPS Agreement 
forbids?164 Both questions can be resolved with either the obvi-
ousness doctrine or its European equivalent, the inventive step. 
The Supreme Court’s main concern in redefining the patent-
able subject matter doctrine was preventing patents from claim-
ing the “building blocks of human ingenuity” and thereby exclud-
ing others from utilizing them.165 Obviousness determinations 
under § 103 should adequately address this concern by eliminat-
ing unnecessary and overbroad patents. Under obviousness, in-
ventions are patentable if nonobvious to a person having ordi-
nary skill in the art.166 The hypothetical person of skill knows all 
pertinent prior art references, which would include underlying 
natural phenomena and laws already known to man.167 Because 
 
 161. See Tony Dutra, House Judiciary Committee Moves Patent Bill For-
ward, Battle over Fee Shifting Looms, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 18, 2015), https:// 
www.bna.com/house-judiciary-committee-n17179927818. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quoting 
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1301 
(2012)). 
 164. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 155, art. 27, ¶ 1. 
 165. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2354. 
 166. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
 167. See In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (“We think the 
proper way to apply the 103 obviousness test to a case like this is to first picture 
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epigenetics-based technology so closely utilizes underlying natu-
ral phenomena and laws, many patents that insufficiently trans-
form their underlying subject matter should also be obvious to a 
person skilled in molecular biology. 
This likely obviousness can be illustrated using Myriad’s 
ruling on cDNA. Scientists create cDNA by removing noncoding 
regions of nucleotides from a natural RNA molecule and then 
converting it into a DNA-equivalent.168 Under a § 101 analysis, 
the Court considered cDNA patent eligible because it “is distinct 
from the DNA from which it was derived.”169 Under an obvious-
ness analysis, however, the cDNA likely would not be patenta-
ble. The process of generating cDNA, reverse transcription, is 
well known to those skilled in the art of molecular biology, mak-
ing the invention obvious.170 As this example shows, obviousness 
sometimes poses a larger hurdle to patentability than § 101 does. 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s concerns about overbroad pa-
tents chilling scientific advancement can still be met even if Con-
gress categorically exempts epigenetics-based technology from 
§ 101. 
The TRIPS Agreement poses another interesting hurdle for 
the solution posed by this Note. Article 27.1 states that “patents 
shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimi-
nation as to . . . the field of technology.”171 Neither TRIPS nor 
subsequent WTO decisions provide much clarification regarding 
the scope of this discrimination provision.172 The only WTO 
panel to consider Article 27.1 defined discrimination as “the un-
justified imposition of differentially disadvantageous treatment” 
 
the inventor as working in his shop with the prior art references—which he is 
presumed to know—hanging on the walls around him.”). 
 168. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 
2119 (2013). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Generating cDNA has become such a routine practice for molecular bi-
ologists that commercial suppliers sell kits that allow even high-school-age stu-
dents to generate it. See, e.g., Cells-to-cDNA™ II Kit, THERMOFISHER SCIEN-
TIFIC, https://thermofisher.com/order/catalog/product/AM1722 (last visited Apr. 
19, 2018). 
 171. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 155, art. 27, ¶ 1. 
 172. Apart from article 27, ¶ 1 itself, the only guidance on how to interpret 
TRIPS’s prohibition on discrimination comes from WTO panel decision DS114 
concerning Canadian pharmaceutical patents. A HANDBOOK ON THE WTO 
TRIPS AGREEMENT 107–08 (Antony Taubman et al. eds., 2012). 
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and noted that discrimination “may arise from explicitly differ-
ent treatment, sometimes called ‘de jure discrimination.’”173 A 
categorical exemption from § 101 explicitly treats epigenetics-
based technology differently, and, in that sense, could be con-
strued as discrimination favoring epigenetics.174 Considering bi-
otechnology’s susceptibility to § 101 invalidation,175 however, 
the categorical exemption would remedy a disadvantage rather 
than provide an advantage. The United States already has taken 
the position “that not all differential treatment is ‘discrimina-
tion,’”176 and could defend a categorical exemption by arguing 
that biotechnology’s susceptibility justifies the differential treat-
ment, and results in no disadvantage for other fields of technol-
ogy. Based on the WTO panel’s own definition,177 such treatment 
would not be discrimination. It would not impact the availability 
of patents or patentees’ ability to enjoy patent rights for other 
technology, and merely ensures that the same holds true for ep-
igenetics. 
If the solution does violate the TRIPS Agreement, however, 
then a minor modification should bring it into compliance. In-
stead of categorically exempting epigenetics-based inventions 
from § 101, Congress could replace the Mayo analysis with the 
EPO’s inventive-step standard. This solution removes epigenet-
ics-based technology from the Mayo analysis, leaving it with dif-
ferent, but not necessarily lesser, patentability requirements 
than other types of technology. Accordingly, epigenetics would 
not gain an unjustified advantage over other fields of technology. 
While adopting a foreign standard seems complicated, the simi-
larities between obviousness and inventive step should make it 
 
 173. Panel Report, Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, 
¶ 7.94, WTO Doc. WT/DS114/R (adopted Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Panel Re-
port]. Unfortunately, the panel provided no clarification on when discrimination 
does not “arise from explicitly different treatment,” as it decided the Canadian 
law did not de jure discriminate. See id. at ¶ 7.94–.99. 
 174. Exempting epigenetics from § 101 does not conflict with TRIPS’s three 
mandatory patentability requirements: novelty, nonobviousness, and “capable 
of industrial application.” See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 155, art. 27, ¶ 1. 
Even absent § 101, U.S. patent law still imposes these three patentability re-
quirements. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (novelty); id. §103 (nonobviousness); id. 
§ 112 (best mode and enablement). 
 175. See Sachs, supra note 8, fig.2 (showing that § 101 challenges invalidate 
certain fields, including biotechnology, at a disproportionately high rate). 
 176. Panel Report, supra note 173, ¶ 7.100. Australia and the United States, 
both third parties, took this position based on legal rulings on the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and WTO. Id. 
 177. Id. ¶ 7.94 (defining discrimination as “the unjustified imposition of dif-
ferentially disadvantageous treatment”). 
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relatively easy to implement. Judges engage in the same basic 
analysis, but use a problem-solution approach to decide whether 
a person of skill in the art would consider the invention obvi-
ous.178 As discussed above for obviousness,179 inventive-step 
analysis should adequately address the Supreme Court’s con-
cerns about patents “‘improperly tying up the’ . . . building blocks 
of human ingenuity.”180 In fact, inventive step appears even bet-
ter suited for this purpose than obviousness, given its resem-
blance to Mayo step two’s inventive concept requirement.181 Re-
placing § 101 analysis with inventive-step analysis should also 
avoid any doctrinal changes which could convolute the Mayo test 
further. 
  CONCLUSION   
Mayo, Myriad, and Alice streamlined the patentable subject 
matter doctrine into a two-part test that proves difficult to apply 
to epigenetics-based inventions. The close relation between epi-
genetics-based inventions and their underlying natural phenom-
ena and laws complicates patent eligibility determinations, re-
sulting in inconsistent invalidation decisions and uncertain 
patent rights. This uncertainty creates problems in growing bio-
tech fields, where start-ups need clearly enforceable patent 
rights to attract investment or acquisition. Without investment 
or acquisition, epigenetics start-ups lack the capital and regula-
tory expertise to efficiently bring new cures to market. Instead 
of leaving epigenetics mired in uncertain intellectual property 
rights, Congress should address this issue by categorically ex-
empting epigenetics-based inventions from § 101, with the un-
derstanding that the obviousness requirement from § 103 ade-
quately addresses the Supreme Court’s concerns about overly 
broad patents stagnating progress. 
 
 178. EPO GUIDE, supra note 39, at 17. 
 179. See supra notes 166–70 and accompanying text. 
 180. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quoting 
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1301 
(2012)). 
 181. Id. at 2357. The problem-solution approach of an inventive-step analy-
sis also comports with a recent Federal Circuit ruling on § 101 in which it found 
claims “directed to a specific implementation of a solution to a problem in the 
software arts.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 
2016). In effect, an inventive-step analysis may be roughly equivalent to a Mayo 
analysis that utilizes prior art. 
